How Much Oil and Gas Does The UK Have Left?

In March, when Qatar halted its exports of liquefied gas after ships could no longer pass through the Strait of Hormuz, gas from Britain’s own fields had no strait to pass through: it comes ashore by pipe

It doesn’t set the price we pay: the UK Energy Research Centre is right that prices ‘are driven by international markets’.

But it equalled about half of Britain’s gas demand last year. The North Sea’s taxes are paid here too: £4.3bn in 2025-26, and £9.0bn in 2022-23, when prices were at their worst.

The government’s view is that the North Sea is running out. Its statisticians wrote this year that ‘declines are expected as reserves have been depleted‘. Its consultation on the North Sea says: ‘Our North Sea no longer has the reserves available to meet domestic energy demand.’

Both sentences are true of reserves. To see why they mislead, you need to know how oil and gas are counted.

The industry counts them on three shelves.

The bottom shelf holds what hasn’t yet been found: prospects mapped from seismic surveys, each marked down for its chance of being dry.

The middle shelf holds what has been found by drilling and sized up, but which nobody has yet committed to or been allowed produce. The industry calls these contingent resources.

The top shelf holds reserves, and in Britain the bar is high.

Since 2015, the regulator, the North Sea Transition Authority (NSTA), explains in its report, a project counts as reserves ‘only where the project has been sanctioned by the participants and the NSTA has issued a Development and Production Consent’.

A reserve, in other words, doesn’t measure what’s in the ground. It measures what the government has allowed someone to decide to spend money on. Oil and gas climb from shelf to shelf only by drilling, and drilling is a bet.

Over the decade to 2020, about six British exploration wells in ten found oil or gas, but only about three in ten found enough to be worth producing, by the count of the industry’s own body. The company pays for the dry holes out of the wells that work.

Compare wind: a developer has hourly weather data back to 1940 and can win a price guaranteed for twenty years before it builds anything. An oil company knows nothing for certain until the drill reaches the rock.

Now read the North Sea off the shelves, in years of what Britain used in 2025. The top shelf holds about four years of our oil and under two and a half years of our gas. That’s the number behind ‘depleted’.

The middle shelf holds more than twice as much: about nine years of oil and five of gas. Together, found by the drill and counted by the regulator, that’s more than thirteen years of our oil and seven and a half years of our gas, or fifteen years of gas at today’s output, which meets half our needs.

Two billion barrels of oil equivalent (a measure that counts gas as the oil it matches in energy) sit in discoveries nobody holds a licence for. Below them, the regulator’s mapped prospects hold a further 4.6bn barrels of oil equivalent, about half as much as everything found.

The regulator’s own outlook expects only 3.3bn barrels of oil equivalent to be produced between 2026 and 2050. That’s barely more than the 2.9bn on today’s top shelf, and it leaves roughly two-thirds of what has been found where it is.

Onshore, the oil is small: about 12,000 barrels a day in 2024, the lowest for 37 years, three-quarters of it from Wytch Farm in Dorset. The gas is the great unknown.

In 2013 the British Geological Survey put the gas in the Bowland shale of northern England at a central 1,329 trillion cubic feet, about 600 years of what Britain now uses.

It warned that this was ‘the entire volume of gas contained in the rock formation, not how much can be recovered’. A 2019 laboratory study put the most there could be at about a tenth of that, and the recoverable part at under ten years of consumption.

That study assumed one-tenth of the gas could be got out. Apply the same rate to the survey’s figure and it comes to about sixty years.

Nobody knows which is nearer, because the shale has never left the bottom shelf. Fracking has been under ‘an effective moratorium‘ since 2019, and the Energy Independence Bill, published last week, ends new onshore licences in England, ‘including those which could be used for hydraulic fracturing’.

Coal is different: falling demand, more than the rules, brought it down, and the last coal power station closed in 2024.

But Great Britain still has 3.8bn tonnes of coal judged economically recoverable according to a survey by the British Coal Corporation in 1994, which they said would last 500 years at the then rate of use.

Last year it mined 120,000 tonnes, and its supply was ‘maintained mostly by imports’; two-thirds of its coking-coal imports came from the United States.

And is that all we can expect from discovery? A look at Norway, which works the other half of the same sea, suggests ‘no’. In 2025 it drilled 29 exploration wells in its North Sea and made 11 discoveries there.

In 2024 Britain’s four exploration wells found under 100m barrels of oil equivalent between them. Norway’s North Sea reserves stood at about 9.6bn barrels of oil equivalent at the end of 2025, against Britain’s 2.9bn, for all its waters, a year earlier.

I’ve worked in both sectors. The tax rate doesn’t explain the difference. While Britain’s windfall levy lasts, both countries take 78 percent of each extra pound of oil profit.

What differs is who pays for the dry hole. Norway’s system is meant, in its government’s words, to be ‘neutral, so that an investment project that is profitable for an investor before tax is also profitable after tax’.

If a company makes a loss, the state pays back the following year what that loss is worth against the special tax. The state also holds its own stakes in 48 producing fields. It shares the dry hole and the strike.

Britain takes the same 78 percent of the winner. But a newcomer with no British profits must carry its losses forward, uplifted by 10 percent a year for up to ten years, rather than be paid back.

Britain’s windfall levy has been raised twice and extended twice. A drilling programme takes years to pay for itself. No board starts one when the rules on its winners may change before it pays.

And the new Bill ‘removes the NSTA’s power to grant new oil and gas licences’. The ban is already the government’s policy, and more than any tax, it’s what now stops exploration.

None of this makes the North Sea young. It’s mature, and its output will keep falling whatever is decided. Onshore oil is a rounding error. Norway’s sector is larger, and parts of it are barely explored.

A better deal wouldn’t make Britain an exporter again. But it would slow the decline, keep more of our gas arriving by pipe rather than by tanker for longer, and keep much-needed tax revenues flowing.

So how much is left? Offshore, more than a decade of our oil and years of our gas, found by the drill and counted by the regulator. Onshore, an unknown amount of gas that nobody’s allowed to look for, possibly decades of it.

And coal we could dig rather than ship in: about sixty years of it at the rate we burned it as recently as 2012. The answer depends less on the rock than on whether anyone is allowed to climb the shelves.

Britain already knows how to share an investor’s risk: it does so for wind. For oil and gas it makes a newcomer wait for its losses, keeps changing the rules on the winners, and is writing into law an end to new exploration licences.

See more here substack.com

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