Critical Minerals and the Trade War for National Security
As I mentioned in a recent video (which has garnered over 300,000 views – thank you!), Washington has found itself in a predicament: its vulnerability has been exposed for the entire world to see
China controls approximately 78 percent of the rare earth minerals essential for supporting the production of over 1,900 weapon systems in the United States.
In a great power competition, such dependency is a vulnerable weakness for one side, and significant leverage for the other.
Let’s take a deeper dive into the latest research that proves just how dependent the United States military is on China.
First, we’ll examine the broader context, and later, we will focus on the military-industrial aspect.
Just days before the upcoming high-stakes Xi–Trump summit in South Korea, Beijing has unveiled sweeping new export restrictions on rare earth elements, lithium-ion batteries, graphite, and synthetic diamonds.
These materials underpin everything from electric vehicles to advanced U.S. weapon systems.
Ironically, America relies heavily on China for its supply of rare earth minerals. The United States procures nearly 70 percent of rare earth minerals from China, followed by 13 percent from Malaysia and six percent from Japan.
Although the U.S. has vast resources of its own, the lack of processing facilities and related infrastructure has put Washington in a difficult position.
A map, created by the U.S. Geological Survey and the U.S. Department of the Interior, indicates that there are more than 800 areas identified by researchers as geological systems containing 23 types of minerals in the U.S., some of which could be rare earth elements.
While America has access to these deposits through extraction, the downstream processing is almost entirely dependent on China.
Source: U.S. Geological Survey. A map identifying focus areas for 23 mineral systems that could host critical mineral resources in the U.S.
China’s dominance in rare earths is unmatched. It is home to a third of the world’s rare earth mineral deposits and produces approximately 70 percent of the global supply, holding nearly half of the known reserves.
However, more critically, it controls over 90 percent of global refining capacity — the stage at which raw minerals are transformed into usable components for high-tech and military applications.
China dominates all stages of many critical mineral supply chains due to a strategic model that relies on consistent state support of the industry. Even nations that mine rare earths, like Australia or Canada, rely on China for processing.
China’s latest curbs mean exporters using even trace amounts of Chinese rare earths will now require licenses, effectively tightening Beijing’s control over global supply chains.
The United States, meanwhile, faces the daunting challenge of rebuilding its long-abandoned mineral infrastructure—a process that could take decades, require trillions of dollars in investment, and unwavering bipartisan commitment (which might prove to be the most challenging ingredient).
According to a new report from U.S. defense analytics firm Govini, 77.7 percent of the Pentagon’s weapon systems contain Chinese-sourced minerals. The F-35 fighter jet alone uses over 900 pounds of rare earths.
Any disruption could delay or even halt production across the U.S. defense-industrial base.
According to the report issued by Govini, a defense technology company, antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten, and tellurium each play specialized roles in military applications and are indispensable for modern defense infrastructure.
Yet, their supply chains remain vulnerable to geopolitical risks even as the U.S. Department of War has been increasing its demand for these commodities by approximately 23 percent annually since 2010.
Washington’s growing reliance on rare earth minerals imported from China is a result of decades-long procurement policies, as well as deliberate deindustrialization within the United States.
“More than 80,000 parts across 1,900 weapon systems incorporate antimony, gallium, germanium, tungsten, or tellurium, meaning nearly 78 percent of all DoD weapon systems are potentially affected.
This dependence spans across the military services. Over 91 percent of Navy weapon systems rely on these materials, while 61.7 percent of Marine Corps systems rely on parts connected to these critical minerals (Figure 3).
Some of the systems most impacted include the Arleigh Burke Class destroyers, America Class amphibious assault ships, Nimitz Class aircraft carriers, and the Minuteman III nuclear missile program.”
Not surprisingly, military superiority requires constant modernization. The report emphasizes that the expansion of operational demand has driven the reliance on rare minerals from China.
For example, antimony is used in four key weapon systems—the F-16 fighter jet, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the Minuteman III missile, and the Wasp-class amphibious assault ship.
Ironically, more than 80 percent of the antimony required for these systems is affected by the recent export restrictions imposed by China in response to the Trump administration’s declaration of a trade war.
Additionally, more than 60 percent of the world’s antimony is mined in China, and nearly one-third of the antimony initially processed elsewhere is refined in China.
In other words, theoretically speaking, the United States requires permission (i.e., favorable trade policies) from China to wage war against China. While the United States could, technically, mine its own rare earth minerals, it would still require third-party processing capabilities.
Currently, the United States exports raw precursors for more than 35 critical minerals to China for processing, only to have them re-imported.
In a world where power is increasingly measured not only by military might but also by control over critical resources, the United States finds itself dangerously reliant on China for the minerals that underpin its defense systems.
From advanced missiles to fighter jets, the journey “from rock to rocket” exposes a supply chain vulnerability that strikes at the heart of U.S. national security. Logically, one would assume that such vulnerability would lead to more prudent trade policies and less aggressive posturing.
While Washington has outlined potential solutions, such as diversifying supply sources and ramping up domestic production, progress remains modest compared to the scale of the challenge.
Experts argue that the U.S. must urgently reimagine its critical supply chains, expand strategic mineral reserves, and strengthen partnerships with trusted allies.
Most importantly, however, it requires a wise and committed approach to economic policies with China – one that is built on respect, cooperation, and de-escalation.
See more here worldaffairsincontext.com
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