US Supreme Court Ruling Shakes Up Environmental Regulations

The Supreme Court’s decision in the consolidated cases of Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless Inc. v. Department of Commerce has far-reaching implications for administrative law and environmental regulation

Delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the ruling overrules the long-standing Chevron deference doctrine, fundamentally altering the regulatory landscape and potentially leading to the declassification of CO2 as a ‘pollutant’.

For more info about the case check out:  the-case-that could destroy the administrative state

Since 1984, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. required courts to defer to federal agencies’ reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutes.

This two-step framework first assesses whether Congress has directly addressed the precise issue and then, if the statute is ambiguous, defers to the agency’s permissible interpretation.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision arose from two cases involving the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA).

The cases challenged the agency’s authority to require Atlantic herring fishermen to pay for at-sea observers. Lower courts had upheld the NMFS rule, relying on Chevron deference to resolve statutory ambiguities in favor of the agency’s interpretation.

The Supreme Court’s opinion emphasizes the judiciary’s role in interpreting laws, as established in Marbury v. Madison. Chief Justice Roberts underscored that judicial deference to agency interpretations conflicts with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which mandates courts to decide all relevant questions of law.

The Court concluded that Chevron’s presumption of implicit congressional delegation of interpretive authority to agencies is a legal fiction, not supported by the APA’s text or historical context.

This ruling significantly curtails the power of regulatory agencies by requiring courts to exercise independent judgment on statutory ambiguities, rather than deferring to agency interpretations. The decision mandates that courts must independently interpret statutes, ensuring that agencies do not overstep their authority.

Justice Kagan dissents from the decision to overturn the Chevron deference doctrine.

Kagan argues that agencies possess expertise and political accountability, making them better suited than courts to resolve technical, complex, or policy-laden issues. Chevron deference respects this division of labor and has become entrenched in the legal system, guiding regulatory efforts and judicial decisions across various domains.

The majority’s decision, Kagan contends, shifts interpretive authority from agencies to courts, reflecting judicial overreach rather than humility. She criticizes this move for disregarding established precedent without sufficient justification, undermining the principle of stare decisis, which promotes legal stability and predictability.

The court’s decision may have significant implications, particularly in the context of energy regulations and the classification of CO2 as a pollutant. The Environmental Protection Agency has historically leveraged Chevron deference to interpret the Clean Air Act in a manner that supports the regulation of CO2 emissions.

This approach has been central to the EPA’s efforts to address ‘climate change’ and reduce ‘greenhouse gas’ emissions.

The Clean Air Act, passed long before the contemporary narrative on ‘climate change’ emerged, does not explicitly mention CO2 or ‘climate change’.

Instead, it uses broad terms like “pollutants,” allowing the EPA to interpret these terms to include CO2 under its regulatory purview. Chevron deference has enabled the EPA to make such interpretations without the need for Congress to update the Act explicitly, relying on the agency’s expertise in environmental science and policy.

With Chevron overruled, the judicial landscape changes dramatically. Courts, rather than deferring to the EPA’s expertise, will now re-evaluate whether the Clean Air Act unambiguously authorizes the regulation of CO2 emissions.

The Supreme Court’s decision marks a seismic shift in administrative law, emphasizing judicial independence in statutory interpretation.

By overruling Chevron deference, the Court has paved the way for significant changes in how regulatory agencies, including the EPA, operate.

This could lead to a reclassification of CO2, fundamentally transforming environmental regulation and potentially declassifying CO2 as a pollutant.

See more here substack.com

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Comments (3)

  • Avatar

    VOWG

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    Corrupt agencies with political agendas are not acceptable. Unelected “experts” making law is unacceptable.

    Reply

  • Avatar

    Crackpot

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    It should be that when faced with the use of government force against your God-given rights, experimental truth is an absolute defense.

    An “interested sixth grader” (Feynman’s standard) could repeat R.W. Wood’s simple experiment disproving the existence of a “greenhouse gas effect.” If your theory doesn’t match experiment, it’s wrong – forever. I’ll take that over expert B.S. any day.

    Reply

  • Avatar

    Carbon Bigfoot

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    The highlighted area in the recent Chevron Decision suggests that the “holdings” of Chevron, meaning the decision that the US EPA could regulate CO2 under the Clean Air Act in the subject lawsuit is still the law. The basis of that decision was a 4mm rise in seal level rise that the “Secret Science” was the caused by CO2. NOT!! Thus a joke perpetrated by SCOTUS. Roberts a major disappointment being the deciding vote. What an A-hole.
    From Chevron:
    The only way to “ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion,” Vasquezv. Hillery, 474 U. S. 254, 265, is for the Court to leave Chevron behind.
    By overruling Chevron, though, the Court does not call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron framework. The holdings of those cases that specific agency actions are lawful—including the Clean Air Act holding of Chevron itself—are still subject to statutory stare decisis despite the Court’s change in interpretive methodology.
    See CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U. S. 442, 457. Mere reliance on Chevron cannot constitute a “ ‘special justification’ ” for overruling such a holding. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U. S. 258, 266 (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U. S. 428, 443). Pp.
    29–35. No. 22–451, 45 F. 4th 359 & No. 22–1219, 62 F. 4th 621, vacated and
    remanded.

    Reply

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